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IN THE
SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
VERA ARLENE FERGUSON,

Plaintiff and
Appellant,

vs.

case No. 14639

LOWELL GENE FERGUSON,
Defendant and
Respondent.
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
NATURE OF CASE

This action was initiated by Plaintiff-Appellant,
after the annulment of her second marriage, seeking reinstatement of alimony payments from her first husband,
Defendant-Respondent herein,

judgment for back alimony

not paid by Defendant-Respondent during the Plaintiff's
second marriage, and increased child support.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The Honorable Stewart Hanson, Jr. ordered that
child support payable by Defendant to Plaintiff be increased from $70.00 per month to $160.00 per month for
each of the parties' three minor children.

The Court

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ruled that Defendant's obligation to pay alimony
ceased upon her remarriage, and that Plaintiff did
not show any evidence of an exceptional circumstance
for which alimony could be reinstated.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant-Respondent respectfully requests that
the court affirm the decision of the Lower court terminating Plaintiff's right to alimony from the Defendant and reverse the Lower Court's award of child
support and attorney's fees in excess of that which
Plaintiff-Appellant prayed for in her Order to Show
cause and pleadings.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendant-Respondent adopts Plaintiff-Appellant's
statement of facts with the following factual and procedural additions:
Factual
Testimony and evidence received at the hearing
of the within matter demonstrated that Plaintiff,
Arlene Ferguson, did not request alimony from the
husband of her remarriage solely on the basis of her
feeling that he would not pay such alimony, if awarded.
No showing was made to the annulling court of her financial
need (T. 126) or of her husband's ability to pay, yet
evidence was received in this matter that Mr. Hunsaker
-2Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

had the financial ability to support his former wife
both during and after their marriage.

Mrs. Ferguson

testified that during her marriage to Mr. Hunsaker
both owned and made payments upon their homes and
Mr. Hunsaker made monthly payments to Mrs. Ferguson
in the approximate amount of $250.00 (T. 74).
property was acquired by

Real

Mrs. Hunsaker in anticipa-

tion of the marriage (T. 76), and Mr. Hunsaker, with
Mrs. Hunsaker's consent, applied for a home construction loan within two and one-half months after the
marriage.

Mrs. Ferguson further testified that she

was not aware of Mr. Hunsaker's financial condition
(T. 79), nor did she ask him, and at no time did she
ever seek alimony from Mr. Hunsaker (T. 126).
Procedural
Defendant received notice that Plaintiff's
second marriage was annulled on October 18, 1974.
After several letters from Plaintiff and her counsel
requesting reinstatement and payment of back alimony,
and after the filing of the within Order to Show cause,
Defendant attempted to collaterally attack the Hunsaker
annulment on several grounds, including collusion upon
the District court and lack of jurisdiction in that the
grounds upon which annulment was based were not sufficient to grant jurisdiction to the annulling court.
-3Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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The District court, prior to making its Findings in
the Hunsaker annulment, entered Mr. Hunsaker's default, apparently upon a stipulation between those
parties.

The court then entered Findings and Decree

based upon financial misrepresentations.
Plaintiff's Order to Show Cause requested:
(a) increased child support from $70.00 per child
per month to $140.00 per child per month: (b) increased alimony from $150.00 per month to $300.00
per month: (c) back alimony for the months during
which the Plaintiff was married to Mr. Hunsakerr (d)
$500.00 attorney's fees: and (e) contempt of court
for failure to pay alimony during the subject Hunsaker marriage.
Thereafter, because of Defendant's alleged
refusal to answer interrogatories respecting his
financial condition until Plaintiff proved her
right to reinstatement of alimony, the Law and
Motion Judge entered an Order of Sanction which
deemed Defendant to be financially able to provide
whatever amount the Plaintiff could demonstrate was
needed for child support and alimony, if awarded
(T. 187).

Accordingly, Defendant was not allowed

-4-
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to present any evidence as to his financial status.

y

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE LOWER COURT CORRECTLY REFUSED TO AWARD
PIAINTIFF-APPELIANT BACK AND FUTURE ALIMONY PAYMENTS
Plaintiff-Appellant's entire argument rests upon
two Utah Supreme court decisions, both of which are distinguishable on the facts and both of which have been
made inapplicable to this matter by legislative amendment.
(A)

Enactment of §30-1-17.2, Utah Code Annotated.

As correctly noted and quoted by PlaintiffAppellant, Cecil v. Cecil, 11 U.2d 155, 356 P.2d
279 (1960), held that a husband is obligated to pay
alimony to his former wife after the annulment of her
remarriage since the policy of the state was not
served where the wife could not look to any other
person for such support.

Since annulment proceed-

ings did not grant the court jurisdiction to award

1/

At no time did the Plaintiff-Appellant move to amend
the prayer of relief to conform with Judge Hanson's
finding of child support in the amount of $180.00,
which was $20.00 over that which was requested by the
Plaintiff-Appellant, or $800.00 for attorney's fees,
$300.00 over that which was requested. The court,
on its own motion, amended the petition to "conform"
with its own findings, however, Defendant contends
that it had no jurisdiction to do so.
(See court's
bench ruling at T. 191 and Defendant's arguments at
T. 187).
-5-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

alimony or support, the only other source would be
the wife's former husband:
"There being no valid marriage, the
purported wife would not be entitled to
support from the purported husband, in
the absence of a statute allowing alTrii:ony
in case of annulment."
(Emphasis added)
356 p. 2d at 281.
Since the court's holding in Cecil and in
Kent v. Kent, 28 U.2d 34, 497 P.2d 652 (1972), the
Utah Legislature passed Chapter 65, Laws of Utah,
Section 3(a), which provides, in pertinent part,
as follows:
"30-1-17.2 If the parties have
accumulated any property or acquired
any obligations subsequent to the
marriage, or there is a genuine need
arising from economic change of circumstances due to the marriage, or if
there are children born, or expected,
the court may make temporary and fina 1
orders, and subsequently modify the
orders, relating to the parties, their
property and obligations, the children
and their custody and visitation, and
the support and maintenance of the parties and children, as may be equitable •.. "
Thus, the legislature insured that a wife could,
under the circumstances cited, look tx>the husband of
an annulled marriage for support.

Having released

her first husband by remarriage, she is now authorized
to look to her second husband for support and maintenance.

The Utah Legislature apparently adopted the

arguments of Professor Homer H. Clark, Jr. in his
treaties on the Law of Domestic Relations:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization
provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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"Most of these exceptional cases
arise when the wife's second marriage
is annulled. The conventional analysis formally was that the annulment
amounts to a declaration that no valid
marriage ever existed. The purported
marriage, therefore, cannot effect existing legal rights. Modern cases are
beginning to reject this view, and to
treat the effect of an annulment (at
least for this purpose) as analagous
to the effect of divorce. On that
analysis, the annulment of the wife's
second marriage would not revive her
rights under the alimony decree. This
result is certainly correct as a matter
of policy. Once the wife remarries,
her first husband should be entitled
to assume that his duty to pay her
alimony is at an end, and to adjust
his financial affairs accordingly.
If her second marriage is later annulled, her first husband is not responsible and should not have to face a
revival of a liability which, in many
cases, will cause him unforseeable
hardship. He ought not to be made the
underwriter of his former wife's marital
disasters. The solution for the wife's
difficulties is not to make her first
husband resume the burden, but to pass
a statute like that in New York authorizing alimony in annulment suits."
H. Clark, Law of Domestic Relations,
458 (1968).
Plaintiff's argument that Utah Code Annotated,
§30-1-17.2 does not apply to her case since there was
no finding of a genuine need arising from economic
change of circumstances due to the marriage, fails of
logic where it is shown that not only was such a finding never made, it was never requested by Plaintiff in
her default annulment proceedings.

Plaintiff, by her

-7Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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marriage to Hunsaker, gave up her right to support
($150.00 per month) from the Defendant-Respondent,
and by her annulment gave up an additional $250.00
per month which she was receiving from her second
husband.

Such change of financial circumstance is

a fact which would have allowed her the right to request alimony or support from Hunsaker, which request
was never made.
Plaintiff's contention that the annulment Decree
did not find a genuine need arising from economic change
of circumstances due to the marriage can only imply that
in spite of her loss of alimony and support from Defendant-Respondent herein, and in spite of her anticipated
loss of support from her second husband, no genuine
financial need existed.

For the very same reason, the

Lower court, in the instant matter, found that Plaintiff
had failed to demonstrate not only a genuine need arising from change of circumstances, but also any exceptional circumstance which would allow an unconscionable
or inequitable result if the wife's right to alimony
was terminated.
284 (1954).

Austead v. Austead, 2 U.2d 49, 269 P.2d

In Austead, the Utah Supreme Court held that

remarriage of an ex-wife terminated her right to receive
alimony from her first husband.

The court, however,

noted an exception to the genera 1 rule if "an excep-8Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

tional circumstance" existed where it would be either
unconscionable or inequitable to terminate the wife's
right

~o

al:mony.

In Cecil and Kent, the supreme Court found
exceptional circumstance where the wife's subsequent
marriage was annulled.

In both Cecil and Kent, the

Court relied upon the fact that the wife had no right
to support arising from a marriage which was subsequently annulled, the courts being greatly influenced
by a public policy of insuring to a wife a legal right
to support.

At the same time, the Court recognized

" •.• it would be inequitable for her to obtain the
right to support from two sources."

Cecil, 11 U.2d

at 158, 356 P.2d at 280.
Further, Plaintiff-Appellant's reliance upon
the dictum in Cecil that the wife's attempted marriage
did not adversely alter or change her former husband's
circumstances so that it would be inequitable to require him to continue his alimony payments, is misplaced since (a) no evidence was allowed to be presented that the Defendant-Respondent had in fact
reconunitted his assets and would have suffered adversely
by an award of alimony against him and in favor of
Plaintiff-Appellant, and (b) Plaintiff showed no evidence of the Defendant's circumstances.

No "equitable
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considerations" are cited which would favor an order
that Defendant pay back alimony.

Indeed, the entire

record is devoid of any such equitable considerations.
(B)

Cecil and Kent are Distinguishable.

Both Cecil and Kent dealt with void marriages,
and the District court in each case had the jurisdicti on and power to declare the marriages annulled and
void ab initio.

It is questionable that Plaintiff was

entitled to an annulment upon the grounds indicated in
the annulling court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law.

While Defendant-Respondent does not allege

fraud upon the court, it is obvious that the Hunsaker
parties entered into a stipulation which could well be
regarded as collusive action directly and adversely
effecting the rights of the Defendant-Respondent who
was not allowed, in the Lower court, to collaterally
attack the Hunsaker proceedings.

As the Lower Court

correctly noted in its memorandum decision (T. 151):
" •.• In the instant case the annulment was based upon
fraudulent misrepresentations as to financial status,
at best a ground which at common law made the marriage
voidable."

(T. 152).

Further, equitable considerations were cited in
both Cecil and Kent, thus complying with the standards
set forth in Austead v. Austead.

In both cases, the

-10Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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marriages were extremely short lived: in both cases
the wife could look to no other individual for her
support and

main~enance

oy law: and, in both cases

there is the implication or the stated fact that the
wife was dependent upon charity for her maintenance.
In the instant matter, Plaintiff-Appellant advanced
no "exceptional circumstances" which would allow the
District court to reinstate alimony against her first
husband.

The Lower court is generally afforded wide

latitude in determining both change of circumstance
and the existence of exceptional circumstance, and,
unless found to be capricious or arbitrary, that
finding has constantly been supported in the appellate
process.
POINT II.
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE HER
NEED FOR REINSTATEMENT OF ALIMONY
In its Memorandum Decision dated the 4th day of
November, 1975 (T. 151), the District court, in relying on Austead v. Austead, maintained that in spite of
§30-1-17.2 the court retained jurisdiction to determine
whether "exceptiona 1 circumstances" exist which would
allow a wife to retain alimony upon remarriage.

In

making such a determination, the Court may consider why
no award of alimony was made in the Decree of Annulment,
-11Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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a fact which the Court found to be relevant to the
question of the needs of Plaintiff as they relate
to the reinstatement of alimony.

The court further

found that, since the rights of the Defendant with
respect to his duty to pay alimony were effected by
the determination of the annulling court (or its
lack of determination), Defendant may collaterally
attack the Decree of Annulment to the extent that
such a determination reflected the needs of his former
wife.

Accordingly, it was determined that Plaintiff

had tile burden to establish a prima facia case against
Defendant-Respondent.
The court found that the Plaintiff had not
shown any exceptional circumstances for which alimony should be reinstated.

Indeed, Plaintiff

testified that not only was alimony not awarded
by the annulling court, but she did not request
such alimony.

To the extent that Defendant-Respond-

ent was able to collaterally attack the annulment proceedings, the Court heard and found evidence of Mr.
Hunsaker's financial condition and abilities and it
appears therefrom that, had the Plaintiff sought such
support from Hunsaker, he would have indeed been able
to provide such financial support. (T. 159-172).

The

Court found that there was indeed an economic change
-12Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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of circumstance due to the marriage of the Plaintiff
and Mr. Hunsaker, however, no genuine need arose therezrom.

I~

is

i::ogi~a:

for Plaintiff to assert that,

while no genuine need arose from her change of circumstance as a result of her marriage to Mr. Hunsaker or
as a result of the annulment of the Hunsaker marriage,
there was a genuine need or change of circumstance
which would give rise to a reinstatement of alimony
from the Defendant herein, especially in the absence
of other facts which would evidence any other genuine
need of the Plaintiff.
POINT III.
THIS COURT SHOULD AFFIRM THE LOWER COURT'S
DECISION IN REFUSING TO AWARD BACK OR FUTURE ALIMONY
TO PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT
The Lower court, in its Memorandum Decision, correctly recognized that

11

in any event, alimony is not

automatically reinstated without a determination by the
court of those respective needs and abilities (referring
to the parties) and if reinstated, runs from the date
of reinstatement, not from the date of a voided
marriage.

11

(T. 153).

Plaintiff's reliance that the annulment was
void ab initio and therefore should relate back to
the date of the marriage is simply a legal fiction
designed to do justice between the parties to the
-13Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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annulled marriage and should be pierced to protect
the rights of a third party.

Sefton v. Sefton, 291

P.2d 439, 45 Cal.2d 872 (1955).
"However, in cases involving the
rights of third parties, courts have
been especially wary less the logical
appeal of the fiction should obscure
fundamental problems and lead to unjust
or ill advised results respecting a
third party's rights. Thus, the exceptions to the theory of 'relation
back' should have their typical application to situations effecting an
innocent third party.
See, 55 C.J.S.,
Marriage, §68." 291 P.2d at 441.
The Utah Legislature recognized the inherent
unfairness of the "relation back" lega 1 fiction as
it effects the rights of third parties by enacting
Section 30-1-17, Utah Code Annotated at the same time
that it amended the annulment provisions authorizing
the award of alimony in an annulment proceeding.
legislature stated:

The

"The judgment in the action shall

either declare the marriage valid or annulled and
shall be conclusive upon all persons concerned with
the marriage."
as amended).

§30-1-17, Utah code Annotated (1953
It is submitted that the language "a 11

persons concerned with the marriage" concerns only
those parties directly concerned with the marriage
and not those third persons whose rights would be
effected without any notice or right to participate
in the annulment proceeding.
-14Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Finally, Plaintiff is contending that she was,
during the period of her remarriage, entitled to two
sources of support, i.e., from her former husband
and her then husband.
POINT IV.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN AWARDING CHILD SUPPORT
AND AN AWARD OF ATTORNEYS FEES IN EXCESS
OF THAT PRAYED BY PLAINTIFF IN HER
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE

The court found a change of circumstance with
respect to the minor children of the Plaintiff and
Defendant herein and awarded an increase of child
support to the sum of $160.00 per child per month,
in spite of Plaintiff's requested prayer for an increase to $140.00 per month.

While Defendant agrees

that the District Court always retains jurisdiction
over minor children residing within the jurisdiction
of the sta.te, the Defendant asserts that under these
circumstances the Lower court lacked jurisdiction to
enter such an award, and because this is an equity
matter, the court may and should reverse Judge Hanson's
ruling to the extent of the excess child support or
attorneys fees awarded.
By reason of the Order dated January B, 1976
imposing sanction upon Defendant, Defendant was unable
to assert his defenses to Plaintiff's Order to Show
-15Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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cause on grounds of recommitment of his assets after
Plaintiff's remarriage to her second husband or on his
financial inability to provide any such amount as may
be awarded.

Thus, the Lower court refused, in spite of

Defendant's Motion to Continue the hearing pending
further objections to the Order of Sanctions or appeal,
to allow Defendant to maintain any defenses respecting his
financial abilities to provide the requested child support or alimony.

Assuming its ruling was proper, to the

extent the court made an award within the boundaries of
Plaintiff's prayer for relief, the court exercised its
discretion properly.

However, to the extent the court

awarded any amount in excess of that which was prayed
for by Plaintiff without allowing Defendant to maintain
any defenses with respect to his financial abilities to
provide

t~is

greater amount, the court not only lacked

jurisdiction, but acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner.

This same position holds true for any amounts awarded

for attorneys fees in Plaintiff's favor in excess of that
requested.
It should be noted that at no time during these
proceedings either before or after the Order of Sanction
was imposed, did Plaintiff move to amend her Petition for
Order to Show cause or prayer of relief.

The Order of

Sanction in the manner imposed is similar to a default
-16Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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certificate based upon a party's complaint or petition.
Surely a party who received such a default certificate
in his favor would not +:hereafter amend his default
judgment in an amount in excess of that which the
default certificate was based upon.
Rule 8 of the Utah Rules of civil Procedure
states, in pertinent part:
" (a) Claims for Re lief. A pleading which sets forth a claim for relief,
whether an original claim, counterclaim,
cross-claim or third party claim, sha 11
contain ••• (2) a demand for judgment for
the relief to which he deems himself
entitled."
The rule was drafted and fashioned after Rule
S(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and is
liberally construed.

Thus, the court has held that

in equity proceedings, the relief granted may be somewhat broader than the specific relief prayed for.

The

relief demanded in any petition or complaint is gauged
by the prayer which gives the Defendant or Respondent
such precise information as to the judgment demanded
that he may be able to decide whether or not to defend
such an action.

Thus, the prayer should be specific

enough to conform to the allegations of the Plaintiff's
pleadings and to inform the Defendant of the degree to
which he will choose to defend the matter.
Had the Order of Sanctions not been imposed against
-17Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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the Defendant, it is submitted that the court would have
had full power on its own motion to amend the Plaintiff's
prayer for relief and award whatever amount it deemed
necessary to provide for the minor childrens' support
and maintenance within the confines of the Defendant's
abilities to pay.

However, the Order of Sanction imposed

against the Defendant on January 8, 1976, together with
the trial judge's refusal to allow Defendant to present
any evidence respecting his financial condition imposes
upon the trial court a duty not to grant relief greater
than that which was prayed for since, arguendo, the
Defendant was entitled at such point to determine whether
or not to appeal or request other relief from the Order
of Sanction.

The District court denied Defendant equal

protection of the laws in refusing to allow him to present testimony respecting his financial condition as
it applies to the award granted in excess of that requested, and further denied Defendant the equal protection of the laws granted to an individual to make a
choice to defend or not defend an action.
clearly, this court would hold that a District
court did not have jurisdiction to enter a default judgment in excess of that which was originally prayed for
without amendment by the praying party prior to the entry
of the default certificate.
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CONCLUSION
By amending §30-1-17.2 of the Utah Code Annotated,
the Utah Legislature has chosen, without regard to
whether a marriage is void or voidable, to attach to
annulled marriages sufficient validity and significance
to support an award of alimony so that,

just as the case

of any other valid marriage, there is a continuing duty
to support the wife after the marriage is terminated,
whether by divorce or annulment.

The legislature, in

so doing, destroyed the very foundation of the Cecil and
Kent decisions.

The Plaintiff's actions herein, whether

to remarry or not, or whether to annul such marriage or
terminate the remarriage by divorce, should not, in the
absence of exceptional circumstances, effect the obligation of Defendant herein once having relied an the
Plaintiff's act of remarriage.

Plaintiff has shown no

exceptional circumstance for which this Court, or any
other court, could consider a reinstatement of DefendantRespondent' s obligation to pay alimony to the Plaintiff.
Finally, the District Court acted beyond its
jurisdiction in awarding child support and attorneys
fees to Plaintiff in excess of that which was requested
and, accordingly, such excess award should be, in the
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interest of equity, reversed.
Respectfully submitted this

,2 5" 4

day. of October,

1976.
SANDACK & SANDACK

Attorney for DefendantRespondent
370 East Fifth South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone:
(801) 531-0555
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I have served two copies
of the foregoing Respondent's Brief by hand delivering
the same to Harold G. Christensen and/or Ellen Maycock,
Attorneys for Plaintiff and Appellant, at 700 Continental Bank Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101, this
day of October, 1976.
SANDACK & SANDACK

ROGER D. SANDACK
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